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Abstract 
We investigate how foreign aid dampens the effects of terrorism on FDI using interactive 
quantile regressions. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the 
period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics 
entail: domestic, unclear, transnational and total number of terrorist attacks. The following 
findings are established. First, while the effects of multilateral aid are consistently significant 
with positive threshold evidence, bilateral aid is only positively significant in bottom 
quantiles. Second, with the slight exception of transnational terrorism in bilateral aid 
regressions, the impacts of terrorism dynamics are unexpectedly positive, in: (i) bottoms 
quantiles with domestic terrorism and the 0.25
th
 quantile with total terrorism, for bilateral aid 
regressions, and (ii) the 0.25
th
 quantile with domestic terrorism and bottom quantiles of 
transnational terrorism, for multilateral aid regressions. Third, interactions between terrorism 
and foreign aid dynamics unexpectedly yield negative effects in:  (i) bilateral aid and 
domestic terrorism in bottom quantiles and (ii) multilateral aid and domestic (transnational) 
terrorism in the 0.25
th
(bottom) quantile(s). The modifying threshold value of bilateral aid is 
higher than that of multilateral aid. Fourth, there is positive threshold evidence from GDP 
growth, infrastructural development and trade openness.  Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: C52; D74; F23; F35; O40  
Keywords: FDI; Foreign aid; Terrorism; Quantile regression 
 
1. Introduction 
 Extreme poverty trends recently published by the World Bank in April 2015 reveal 
that developing countries in general, and African nations in particular still have a long way to 
go in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target. 
According to the account, more than 45% of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are off-
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track from the target (World Bank, 2015; Caulderwood, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2015a).  
 It is an economic fact that for extreme poverty to be reduced, growth is needed. 
Whether the growth should be absolute or relative pro-poor is a debate we resist to engage. 
What is granted is that while growth may increase inequality, there is a wide consensus that it 
decreases poverty (Mlachila et al., 2014). It is also widely accepted in academic and policy 
circles that growth essential for poverty reduction can be substantially distorted by political 
instability, violence and terrorists’ activities (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015a). According to 
the authors, nations that are experiencing a persistent 2011 Arab Spring are also seeing their 
growth prospects blurring, an outlook that can be associated with substantial poverty 
externalities. It follows that an economic environment that is unstable due to terrorists’ 
activities is likely to be linked with less access to individual opportunities and essential 
services that are important for economic growth.  
 This tendency is more relevant in post-conflict and fragile states because threats of 
terrorism are translated to portray an uncertain economic outlook, often characterised with 
ambiguity from investors (public and private) who for the most part prefer investment 
strategies that are not clouded with ambiguity (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab).  Essentially, the 
effects of terrorism may endure, with long-lasting negative externalities on economic growth, 
notably: increasing cost of investment, reducing economic savings and output, infrastructural 
damages and burgeoning insurance premiums (Singh, 2001, 2007; Efobi et al., 2015).  
 According to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13), the global trend of 
terrorists’ activities has been increasing since the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. 
Highlighting a few, first, post-Gaddafi Libya is now a failed state, characterised by total 
anarchy with multiple rebel factions and two rival governments, claiming to dictate the law of 
the land. Second, the Yemeni situation is also deteriorating by the day because; recently a 
proxy war has erupted that is being fought by Iran and Saudi Arabia who are in support of 
rebels and the government respectively. It is established in some circles that a cause of the 
conflict is the failure by the government to respect clauses of its socio-economic contract with 
the Yemeni, after the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
Third, the repeated attacks from the Boko Haram in Nigeria are cutting across boundaries 
without respect of territorial integrity, thus affecting neighbouring nations like Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger.  Fourth, negative externalities from the conflict in Syria and fragile 
political situation in Iraq have produced a powerful Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
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(ISIL) that is gaining territory in Iraq and Syria by the day. The effects of ISIL have been far-
reaching, namely the: foiled February 2015 Australian attacks, Sydney-Australian hostage 
crisis in December 2014, failed Verviers-Belgium attacks of January 2015 and Paris-France 
‘Charlie Hebdo’ attacks  of January 2015, which have drawn substantial sympathetic 
mobilisation and global condemnation.  
With the above stylized facts, an evolving stream of the literature is increasingly 
focusing on mechanisms through which various forms of terrorism and political violence can 
be stemmed. Some of the documented instruments include, inter alia: education through 
bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010) and the corruption-
control as the most effective weapon in the fight against conflicts (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2016); internal and external transparency (Bell et al., 2014); publicity and freedom of the 
press (Hoffman et al., 2013); military instruments (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); examination of 
terrorism behaviour (Gardner, 2007); education (Brockhoff et al., 2014), especially lifelong-
learning in the mitigation of political violence and instability (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a), geopolitical fluctuations as primary factors explaining the warfare landscape in SSA 
(Straus, 2012), and the increase of foreign aid (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Bandyopadhyay 
& Younas, 2014).  
An important reason for desiring to stem the rise of terrorist activities is its devastating 
effect on global capital flow. There is a nascent body of literature (e.g. Humphreys, 2005; 
Koh, 2007; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008;Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Bandyopadhyay & 
Younas, 2014;Choi, 2015)that have paid extensive attention to estimating the economic value 
of terrorist attacks on foreign investors. It is observed that a terrorist attack will cost an 
average developing country,whose GDP totalled 70 billion US$,to lose between 324 million 
US$ and 513 million US$ of FDI, and between 296 million US$and 736 million US$ of FDI, 
depending on the origin of the attack (Efobi et al., 2015). This amount is significant for 
developing countries as the inflow of these investors are supposed to augment their resource 
gap considering the low savings, the declining state of development assistance, and poor 
integration of the region in the global capital market (Asiedu, 2006).  
To stem the activities of terrorist, and to sustain the flow of FDI into developing 
countries, recent studies have been oriented towards the improvement of development 
assistance in reducing the potentially negative effect (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et 
al., 2015). Consistent with Efobi et al. (2015), the relevance of foreign aid in curbing the 
adverse consequences of terrorism on FDI in developing nations is a well known convention. 
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This consensus is motivated by the fact that countries that are afflicted by terrorism are poor 
and short of vital resources to fight the scourge (Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2014). They 
sustain that the principal issue with the statistics is that developing nations have begun 
tailoring their foreign policy strategies to attract more foreign investment, hence, terrorism is 
counter-productive to the goal.  Against this background, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and 
Lee (2015) have established that developing assistance can mitigate this potentially counter-
productive effect of terrorism in developing nations by providing the much needed finance to 
fight the scourge. 
 Efobi et al. (2015) have extended Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Bandyopadhyay 
and Younas (2014) by conditioning the dampening role of foreign aid in the effect of 
terrorism on corruption-control levels in recipient countries. They have concluded that: (i) the 
negative impact of terrorism on FDI is only apparent in estimations with above-average 
corruption-control levels; (ii) development assistance dampens the negative impact of 
terrorism on FDI exclusively in countries with above-average corruption-control levels; (iii)  
the modifying role of bilateral aid on the effect of transnational terrorisms is consistent with 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), while the stance that only multilateral aid mitigates the adverse 
consequence of FDI is confirmed principally because it curbs the negative effect of 
transnational terrorism on FDI.  Moreover, the authors also find that the adverse impacts of 
unclear and total terrorism are mitigated by multilateral aid.  
 The above literature leaves room for improvement in at least two main areas: the need 
to incorporate more terrorism dynamics into the investigated relationships and the relevance 
of FDI conditionality.  First, in relation to the need for more dynamics of terrorism, Cho 
(2015) has established in the terrorism-growth literature that it is important to use a plethora 
of variables when investigating the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic indicators. 
The author has shown that political instability variables have various effects across space and 
time. Hence, we are consistent with Efobi et al. (2015) in employing four terrorism indicators, 
namely: domestic, unclear, transnational and total terrorisms. Second, conditioning the 
assessed relationships on FDI levels may have relevant policy implications because blanket 
policies may be ineffective unless they are based on initial FDI levels, and are tailored 
distinctly across high-FDI and low-FDI developing countries. The empirical evidence 
motivating this intuition are the findings of Öcal and Yildirim  (2010) which show that the 
effect of terrorism on economic prosperity depends on cross-regional initial levels of growth. 
The quantile regression empirical strategy adopted by this study is in accordance with this 
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second contribution to the literature because it permits us to investigate the determinants of 
FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI.  
 In light of the above, the line of inquiry adopted by this study is straight forward and 
simple to follow. It extends Efobi et al. (2015), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and 
Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2014) by assessing the role of foreign aid in mitigating the 
potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI throughout the conditional distributions of 
FDI. Hence, for the purpose of comparison, we are consistent with the underlying studies in 
using a panel of 78 developing nations for the period 1984-2008. There are at least two other 
justifications for restricting the scope to developing countries: (i) the negative effects of 
terrorists’ activities have been established to be relatively more apparent in developing 
countries, compared to developed nations which can absorb terrorists’ activities without 
considerable negative externalities (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009) and (ii) development 
assistance is donated by developed nations to less developed countries.  
The empirical evidence is important to the stylized facts enunciated in the first 
paragraph of this introduction because of current global efforts towards sustaining external 
flows like FDI in developing countries (Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Apkan et al., 
2014; Boly, et al., 2015;  Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015b; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015b).   
In essence: (i) FDI is important in driving the growth needed to mitigate extreme poverty and 
(ii) it is important to fight terrorism in order to create an enabling environment for growth.  
It is also important to briefly highlight the theoretical underpinnings on which the 
study is based. Consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) from Akinwale (2010, p. 
125), lines of inquiry that are focused on how to resolve conflicts are for the most part 
motivated by the Conflict Management Model of Thomas-Kilman and the Social Control 
Theory of Black. On the other hand, the former model has advanced strategic intentions that 
are very likely to surround a two-factor matrix (of assertiveness and cooperation) which when 
combined with collaboration, leads to five main styles of conflict management, namely: 
avoidance, competition, collaboration, accommodation and compromise. On the one hand, 
according to the latter, the relationships among individuals, groups and organisations 
significantlyaffect the exercise of one of the five fundamental instruments of social control, 
namely: tolerance, self-help, settlement, negotiation and avoidance. The accounts of 
Akinwale, Asongu and Nwachukwu arebroadly consistent with the conflict management 
literature, inter alia: Black (1990), Thomas (1992), Borg (1992) and Volkema and Bergmann 
(1995).  
7 
 
The theoretical underpinnings converge with the present paper in the perspective that 
foreign aid is a policy variable that may be designed to influence conditions articulated by the 
Social Control theory and Conflict Management Model. Accordingly, development 
assistance, among others: increases education, improves compliance with the rule of law, 
increases government expenditure and encourages social responsibility. For instance, 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) have established that terrorism decreases growth potentials by 
reducing government expenditure allocated for growth-enhancing investments. For brevity 
and lack of space, the interested reader can have more insights into  other factors (respect for 
the rule of law, education and social responsibility) from the wealth of studies on political 
violence and instability (Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; Oreopoulos & 
Salvanes, 2009; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016ab). For example, Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2016b) have established that development assistancepositively affects the demand-side of 
education and lifelong-learning and in a latter study, they have concluded that education and 
lifelong-learning increase political stability and non-violence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a). Given the above, the testable hypothesis of the present line of inquiry is simply and 
straight forward to follow: we examine the role of foreign aid inmitigating a hypothetically 
negative effect of terrorism on FDI. 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the data and 
methodology.  The empirical results and policy implications are discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes with recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 Consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015), we examine a 
panel of 78
1
 developing countries with three year non-overlapping intervals data for the 
period 1984-2008. The choice of sample size and periodicity are based on: (i) availability of 
foreign aid and terrorism data, (ii) constraints in the availability of other variables in the 
                                                          
1
The panel includes the following developing countries : “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El 
Salvador, Kenya, Panama, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, 
Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, 
Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, 
Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and 
Sudan”. 
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conditioning information set and (iii) the motivation of comparing the findings with 
resultsofprevious studies that have employed the same sample and periodicity, notably: 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015).   
Whereas the dependent variable is net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP, the main 
independent variable of interest consists of terrorism dynamics, namely: unclear, domestic, 
transnational and total terrorisms. We employ two development assistance ‘modifying 
variables’ in the interactive regressions: multilateral and bilateral aid. The adopted control 
variables are: trade openness, GDP growth, inflation and infrastructural development. The 
choice of these dependent, independent, modifying and control variables are consistent with 
the underlying studies motivating this line of inquiry.  
We now devote some space to briefly providing further justification for the choice of 
variables. First, development assistance provides economic resources,much needed for 
logistical and infrastructural investments in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, it may also 
create an enabling environment for decreasing political instability and non-violence by 
providing resources like human capital (Asiedu et al., 2009). Accordingly, foreign aid 
increases education (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) and improving education has been 
recently established to decrease political instability and violence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a). It follows that education; especially lifelong-learning can reduce the proportion of 
vulnerable citizens recruited for terrorist activities. The interest of decomposing aggregated 
foreign aid into its multilateral and bilateral components is to enable more options for policy 
implications (Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Johnson & Quartery, 2009; Asiedu, 2014; Asongu, 
2014ab; Efobi et al., 2014)
2
.  
The choice of control variables are also in line with mainstream FDI literature 
(Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011). Drawing from the literature, we expect trade openness, 
GDP growth and infrastructural development to positively affect FDI while inflation should 
have a negative effect.  Accordingly, GDP growth pulls foreign investment owing to 
anticipated returns of investment. Trade openness is most likely to be positively associated 
with FDI because FDI activities entail the importing and exporting of raw materials and 
finished commodities. Developing countries with better infrastructural development 
intuitively have an edge in attracting FDI owing to relatively lower transaction and production 
costs, ceteris paribus. We expect high inflation to reduceforeign investment prospects due to, 
                                                          
2
 For instance, Asongu (2014a) by decomposing aggregated aid has clarified the questionable economic of 
development assistance advanced by Asongu (2014b). Asiedu and Nandwa (2007), Johnson and Quartey (2009), 
Asiedu (2014) and Efobi et al. (2014) consistently articulate the need to integrate foreign aid heterogeneity.  
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inter alia: (i) a negative economic outlook and (ii) reducing purchasing power and domestic 
consumption.  
 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Foreign Investment FDI Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDI)  
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) and 
Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational terrorism Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
 
 Table 1 summarises the definition of the variables while Table 2 provides the 
summary statistics. It can be noticed that some of the variables have been defined in 
logarithms in the former to enable the comparison of ‘mean values’ in the latter. The 
substantial variation informs us that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge from the 
empirical analysis.  
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs. 
      
Foreign Direct Investment 2.494 3.240 -8.875 26.067 612 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs.: Observations. 
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 The purpose of Table 3 is to decrease potential issues of overparameterization and 
multicollinearity that are articulated in bold. As expected, terrorism and foreign aid variables 
are highly correlated. Hence, we avoid employing two foreign aid or terrorism variables in the 
same specification. We also notice that while the dependent variable is negatively correlated 
with terrorism variables, it is also negatively (positively) correlated with bilateral 
(multilateral) aid. Whereas the negative correlation between FDI and bilateral aid is contrary 
to the intuition motivating the testable hypothesis enunciated in the introduction, two 
justifications motivate pursuing the line of inquiry. First, it is standard in econometrics that 
correlations should not be assimilated to causalities. Second, the bilateral aid variable is 
employed as a modifying policy variable. Hence, it could interact with terrorism to reveal 
other unexpected dynamics.  
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
            
 Control Variables Foreign Aid Terrorism Dynamics   
FDI GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnBilaid LuMulaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.193 0.430 0.263 -0.113 -0.049 0.001 -0.118 -0.093 -0.112 -0.121 FDI 
 1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.195 0.178 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 GDPg 
  1.000 0.296 -0.230 -0.267 -0.289 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 LnTrade 
   1.000 -0.121 -0.376 -0.514 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 LnTel 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.023 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 LnInflation 
     1.000 0.721 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 Domter 
        1.000 0.528 0.785 Tranater 
         1.000 0.789 Unclter 
          1.000 Totter 
            
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. LnTrade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. 
LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  Domter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational 
terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of terrorism incidents.    
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
Consistent  with the literature on conditional determinants (Billger &Goel, 2009; 
Asongu, 2013), and in order to examine if existing levels in FDI affect the incidence of 
terrorism and/or foreign aid  on ‘FDI location decisions’in developing countries, we employ a 
quantile regression (QR) approach. It entailsinvestigating the determinants of FDI throughout 
the distributions of FDI (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on FDI determinants have reported estimated parameters at the 
conditional mean of FDI (Apkan et al., 2014;  Bandyopadhyay; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; 
Efobi et al.,2015).  While mean impacts are important, we extend the underlying stream of 
literaure by employing QR to distinguish between initial levels of FDI. For example, while 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is based on the assumption that FDI  and error terms are 
distributed normally, the QR approach is not founded on the hypothesis thaterror  terms are 
normally distributed. Hence, the techinque enables us to examine the impact of terrorism on 
FDI with particular emphasis on best- and worst-performing countries in terms of FDI, among 
the sampled developing nations. In essence, with QR, parameter estimates are derived at 
multiple points of the conditional distributions of FDI (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). The 
employed QR technique is increasingly being adopted in development literature, among 
others, in: health (Asongu, 2014c) and corruption (Billger &Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 
2012) studies  
The  th quantile estimator of FDI is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of 
simplicity and ease of presentation.   
   






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 





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
ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                             (1)
 
Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of FDI or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of FDI. For the model in Eq. (2), the dependent 
variable iy  is the FDI indicator while ix  contains a constant term, trade, inflation, 
infrastructure, and GDP growth. The specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the 
multicollinearity and overparameterization issues identified in Table 3. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings presented in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively correspond to 
bilateral aid and multilateral aid regressions. Panel A (B) of both tables presents findings for 
domestic and transnational (unclear and total) terrorisms. Consistent with the motivation 
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discussed in the methodological section, an OLS baseline specification is provided to 
articulate modelling differences between conditional means and median values of FDI. Hence, 
the interest of adopting the QR technique is justified by differences in significance and 
magnitude of estimated coefficients between the OLS and QR results. In accordance with 
Brambor et al. (2006), the overall effect of the modifying development assistance variable on 
the examined relationship is assessed in terms of marginal effects.  
The following can be established for Table 4 on the relationships among FDI, 
terrorism and bilateral aid. First, in Panel A, the impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is 
positive in the 0.10
th
 and 0.25
th
 quantiles of the Left Hand Side (LHS), whereas the effect of 
transnational terrorism is negative for the 0.25
th
 quantile in the Right Hand Side (RHS).  In 
Panel B, the effect of unclear terrorism is consistently insignificant on the LHS while the 
impact of total terrorism is positively significant in the 0.25
th
quantile of the RHS. Second, the 
effect of foreign aid is consistently positive only in bottom quantiles of the FDI distributions. 
Third, contrary to the intuition motivating the study, interactions between terrorism and 
foreign aid do not significantly increase FDI as expected. On the contrary, we find thatthe 
combined effect on FDI is negative, in: (i) bottom quantiles in the LHS of PanelA for 
‘domestic terrorism and bilateral aid’ and (ii) the 0.25th quantile in the RHS of Panel B, for 
‘total terrorism and bilateral aid’. Only the modifying threshold for ‘bilateral aid and domestic 
terrorism’ is within the range (0.765 to 8.362) provided by the summary statistics, notably: 
5.5 (0.011/0.002) and 9 (0.009/0.001) respectively for (i) and (ii).  
The significant control variables have the expected signs. While the effect of inflation 
is consistently not significant,the other control variables consistently display positive 
threshold effects. Hence, the positive impact of GDP growth, infrastructure and trade increase 
from low to high quantiles of the FDI distributions. The positive threshold effects imply, the 
benefits of corresponding variables in stimulating FDI consistently increase with higher initial 
levels of FDI.  
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Table 4: FDI, Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism  
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -9.43*** -2.50*** -4.38*** -4.58*** -8.68*** -11.3*** -9.43*** -2.23*** -3.94*** -4.57*** -9.041*** -11.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Domter 0.004 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.343) (0.000) (0.001) (0.471) (0.799) (0.601)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 -0.007 -0.064* -0.012 -0.003 0.040 
       (0.985) (0.835) (0.076) (0.850) (0.983) (0.772) 
LnBilaid 0.190* 0.222*** 0.202*** 0.116 0.219 0.143 0.181 0.173*** 0.152*** 0.101 0.229 0.146 
 (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.196) (0.562) (0.115) (0.001) (0.000) (0.201) (0.163) (0.551) 
Domter* LnBilaid -0.001 -
0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
-0.001 0.0002 0.0006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.202) (0.001) (0.000) (0.414) (0.941) (0.820)       
Tranater* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.003 0.0004 0.009 0.001 -0.004 -0.009 
       (0.778) (0.936) (0.136) (0.917) (0.880) (0.635) 
GDP growth 0.133*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.127*** 0.190** 0.135*** 0.039** 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.123** 0.184** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.022) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.043) 
LnTrade 2.322*** 0.284*** 0.871*** 1.129*** 2.327*** 3.376*** 2.332*** 0.295*** 0.829*** 1.138*** 2.400*** 3.437*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.107 -0.016 -0.009 0.001 0.096 0.213 0.108 0.002 -0.016 0.011 0.091 0.177 
 (0.331) (0.662) (0.796) (0.976) (0.444) (0.295) (0.323) (0.956) (0.688) (0.853) (0.451) (0.386) 
LnInfrastructure  0.401*** 0.213*** 0.313*** 0.569*** 0.500** 0.724** 0.403*** 0.162*** 0.303*** 0.570*** 0.526*** 0.704** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.041) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.040 0.107 0.142 0.150 0.201 0.216 0.040 0.105 0.142 0.149 0.197 
Fisher  19.47***      18.11***      
Observations  546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -9.38*** -2.24*** -4.08*** -4.51*** -8.24*** -10.8*** -9.41*** -2.31*** -4.35*** -4.58*** -8.587*** -11.1*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Unclter  0.001 0.021 0.001 0.020 -0.046 -0.128 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.963) (0.215) (0.954) (0.764) (0.173) (0.437)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 0.001 0.009** 0.004 -0.003 -0.008 
       (0.449) (0.458) (0.011) (0.474) (0.821) (0.531) 
LnBilaid 0.171 0.186*** 0.167*** 0.099 0.172 0.096 0.189* 0.195*** 0.201*** 0.115 0.221 0.133 
 (0.117) (0.000) (0.003) (0.196) (0.370) (0.691) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.215) (0.579) 
Unclter * LnBilaid -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.801) (0.167) (0.776) (0.706) (0.796) (0.581)       
Totter* LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0009 -0.0004 -
0.001*** 
-0.0009 0.0001 0.0007 
       (0.272) (0.360) (0.000) (0.418) (0.961) (0.740) 
GDP growth 0.135*** 0.044** 0.066*** 0.080*** 0.141** 0.207** 0.134*** 0.044** 0.064*** 0.078*** 0.125** 0.193** 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025) (0.023) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.002) (0.031) (0.038) 
LnTrade 2.337*** 0.279*** 0.845*** 0.137*** 2.257*** 3.319*** 2.320*** 0.272*** 0.863*** 1.130*** 2.310*** 3.347*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.099 -0.012 -0.013 -0.0006 0.079 0.193 0.107 -0.0008 -0.009 0.0001 0.090 0.220 
 (0.366) (0.752) (0.758) (0.991) (0.589) (0.348) (0.331) (0.984) (0.827) (0.998) (0.495) (0.294) 
LnInfrastructure  0.390*** 0.180*** 0.300*** 0.556*** 0.547** 0.729** 0.401*** 0.192*** 0.316*** 0.568*** 0.495** 0.729** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.014) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.016) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.039 0.105 0.142 0.149 0.199 0.216 0.040 0.107 0.142 0.150 0.200 
Fisher  20.24***      19.65***      
Observations  546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. 
R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where FDI is least. 
 
The following can be established for Table 5 on the relationships among FDI, 
terrorism and multilateral aid. First, in Panel A, the impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is 
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positive in:  the 0.25
th
quantile of the LHS and bottom distributions of the RHSfor transnational 
terrorism. In Panel B, the effects of unclear and total terrorisms are not significant. Second, 
the effect of foreign aid is consistently positive with threshold evidence. That is, the impact 
consistently increases in magnitude from bottom to top quantiles of the FDI distribution. 
Third, contrary to the intuition motivating the study, the interactions between terrorism and 
multilateral aid does not significantly increase FDI as expected. On the contrary, we find that 
the effect on FDI is negative, in: (i) the 0.25
th
 quantile of the LHS of Panel A for ‘domestic 
terrorism and multilateral aid’ and (ii) bottom quantiles of the RHS of Panel A for 
‘transnational terrorism and multilateral aid’.  
The modifying thresholds of multilateral aidare within the range (-1.249 and 7.105) 
provided by the summary statistics, notably: 4.00 (0.004/0.001) for ‘domestic terrorism’ and 
3.13 (0.047/0.015) and 3.90 (0.039/0.010)’for the 0.10th and 0.25th quantiles of transnational 
terrorism respectively.  
On the control variables, with the exception of GDP growth for which the positive 
threshold evidence is not very apparent, their significances and magnitudes are broadly 
consistent with those established in Table 4, notably: (i) the insignificant effect of inflation 
and (ii) evidence of threshold from the effects of trade openness and infrastructural 
development.  
Table 5: FDI, Multilateral aid, Terrorism 
             
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -11.1*** -2.71*** -4.56*** -6.08*** -9.35*** -14.5*** -11.2*** -2.58*** -4.22*** -6.15*** -9.74*** -13.92*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Domter 0.007** 0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.0007 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.012) (0.308) (0.030) (0.196) (0.798) (0.984)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.049** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.021 0.010 0.022 
       (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.237) (0.886) (0.600) 
LnMulaid 0.454*** 0.192*** 0.230*** 0.281*** 0.479*** 0.690*** 0.460*** 0.193*** 0.220*** 0.250*** 0.460** 0.710*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) 
Domter* LnMulaid -
0.002*** 
-0.0002 -
0.001*** 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.004) (0.520) (0.008) (0.045) (0.627) (0.426)       
Tranater* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017** -
0.015*** 
-
0.010*** 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.013 
       (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.742) (0.303) 
GDP growth 0.108*** 0.039* 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.084 0.169* 0.108*** 0.044* 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.089 0.168* 
 (0.002) (0.070) (0.001) (0.008) (0.169) (0.060) (0.002) (0.065) (0.000) (0.005) (0.159) (0.097) 
LnTrade 2.45*** 0.441*** 0.916*** 1.330*** 2.187*** 3.484*** 2.480*** 0.399*** 0.843*** 1.375*** 2.303*** 3.337*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.123 -0.026 -0.019 0.017 0.083 0.197 0.130 -0.023 -0.009 0.031 0.075 0.129 
 (0.268) (0.585) (0.643) (0.713) (0.597) (0.348) (0.240) (0.639) (0.787) (0.504) (0.614) (0.608) 
LnInfrastructure  0.651*** 0.240*** 0.434*** 0.723*** 0.869*** 1.289*** 0.649*** 0.278*** 0.403*** 0.674*** 0.874*** 1.349*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.239 0.036 0.113 0.151 0.161 0.222 0.238 0.038 0.113 0.149 0.160 0.218 
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Fisher 19.35***      18.80***      
Observations  543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -11.1*** -13.9*** -4.03*** -5.72*** -8.96*** -14.0*** -11.1*** -2.73*** -4.45*** -6.10*** -9.34*** -14.01*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclter  0.023 0.007 -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.273) (0.676) (0.979) (0.710) (0.899) (0.977)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
       (0.016) (0.306) (0.153) (0.211) (0.828) (0.897) 
LnMulaid 0.426*** 0.191*** 0.179*** 0.218*** 0.443*** 0.675*** 0.454*** 0.194*** 0.221*** 0.279*** 0.480*** 0.678*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.004) 
Unclter * LnMulaid -0.006* -0.001 0.0001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.099) (0.595) (0.949) (0.635) (0.711) (0.705)       
Totter* LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.001*** 
-0.0002 -
0.0007** 
-0.001* -0.0008 -0.001 
       (0.004) (0.504) (0.046) (0.062) (0.637) (0.700) 
GDP growth 0.110*** 0.036 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.090 0.169* 0.108*** 0.039* .055*** 0.048** 0.084 0.170 
 (0.002) (0.104) (0.000) (0.003) (0.118) (0.084) (0.002) (0.076) (0.000) (0.010) (0.169) (0.070) 
LnTrade 2.480*** 0.434*** 0.835*** 1.294*** 2.15*** 3.40*** 2.456*** 0.443*** 0.901*** 1.337*** 2.187*** 3.36*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation 0.120 -0.015 -0.012 0.033 0.031 0.159 0.124 -0.023 -0.019 0.016 0.080 0.171 
 (0.279) (0.748) (0.749) (0.511) (0.821) (0.517) (0.267) (0.628) (0.620) (0.739) (0.596) (0.438) 
LnInfrastructure  0.634*** 0.244*** 0.381*** 0.681*** 0.866*** 1.267*** 0.650*** 0.239*** 0.422*** 0.721**** 0.867*** 1.300*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.236 0.036 0.112 0.148 0.160 0.220 0.238 0.036 0.113 0.150 0.161 0.222 
Fisher 20.00***      19.55***      
Observations  543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where FDI is least. 
 
 
3.2 Further discussion of results and implication  
 We set-out to examine how foreign aid can be employed to mitigate the hypothetically 
negative influence of terrorism on FDI in developing countries. The findings have been mixed 
with unexpected and unexpected relationships. While we expected development assistance to 
boost FDI, the positive influence of terrorism on FDI is quite unexpected.  With the slight 
exception of transnational terrorism on the RHS of Panel A in Table 4, we have consistently 
observed the latter tendency, notably the positive impact of terrorism dynamics, in: (i) 
bottoms quantiles with domestic terrorism and the 0.25
th
 quantile with total terrorism, for 
bilateral aid regressions and (ii) the 0.25
th
 quantile with domestic terrorism and bottom 
quantiles of transnational terrorism, for multilateral aid regressions.  
 A number of reasons can be advanced for the unexpected results. First, from a broad 
perspective, terrorism may not significantly affect FDI location decisions in developing 
countries. Accordingly, some foreign investment decisions may even be motivated by high 
returns owing to higher underlying risks. For instance, according to Obi (2008),China has 
been increasing her investment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, despite the threatening 
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Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). This justification is consistent 
with the stream of literature on China targeting investment projects in less developing 
countries that are fragile and unstable politically (Tull, 2006; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Asongu 
& Aminkeng, 2013). Second, another possible elucidation to the unexpected findings may be 
traceable to the fact that prior to the 2011 Arab Spring; terrorism incidences have not been 
very alarming. Accordingly, consistent with the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 
13), global terrorism activities have been soaring substantially in the aftermath of the Spring. 
Third, there is a wealth of literature on the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic 
variables with the consensus that terrorism might not have very significant negative effects on 
economic development, especially in countries with comparatively higher levels of 
development (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009). The consistently insignificant effects of unclear 
and total terrorism dynamics in Panel B of Table 5 broadly attest to this position. Moreover, 
the varying effects of terrorism in terms of signs and insignificance could find explanations in 
Meierrieks and Gries (2013) if the findings are strongly influenced by Latin American 
countries because our sample makes no distinction between the ‘Cold war’ and ‘post Cold 
war’ eras. In analysing the effect of terrorism on economic development, the underlying 
authors have used two sub-samples (the Cold war and post-Cold war eras) to conclude thatthe 
nexus varies across space and time. According to the account, in the Cold war époque, growth 
is established to have swayed terrorists’ activities in nations with intermediate development 
levels that experienced political instability and terrorism in Latin America. Conversely, in the 
post-‘Cold war’ era, terrorists’ activities are established to exert more negative economic 
consequences in Islamic and African nationsexperiencing: (i) growing terrorism and (ii) high 
rates of political openness and political instability. This third explanation is expositional and 
should be treated with caution until it is empirically verified.  
 The immediately preceding narrative has three main implications.  (1) The post-2011 
impact of terrorism on FDI may be substantially different from the findings established in this 
study. (2) Low incidences of terrorism have positively affected FDI location decisions. (3) It 
may be important to also account for the ‘terrorism heterogeneity’from regional perspectives 
(Africa versus Latin America for instance) in order to understand how regional dynamics 
play-out in the underlying relationships. In the present line of inquiry, we have only 
incorporated heterogeneity in terms of types of terrorisms.  
 Second, on the effects of foreign aid dynamics, we have seen that while the effects of 
multilateral aid are consistently significant with positive threshold evidence, bilateral aid is 
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only positively significant in the bottom quantiles of FDI distributions. The latter tendency is 
not very surprising because, from a preliminary analysis based on correlation coefficients, we 
found bilateral aid to be negatively correlated with FDI. Three implications could be derived. 
(1) Bilateral aid correlations with economic variables should be treated with caution unless 
backed by some more robust empirical evidence. (2) The instrumentality of bilateral aid in 
stimulating FDI is more effective in developing countries with lower initial levels of FDI. (3) 
The relevance of multilateral aid in stimulating FDI grows consistently with increasing levels 
of initial FDI.   
 It is important to devote some space to presenting our perspective of why the findings 
of bilateral aid are substantially different from those of multilateral aid.  A possible 
elucidation for the difference is that, bilateral aid may be accompanied with more ‘political 
economy’ strings relative to multilateral aid (Efobi and Nnadi, 2015). It makes sense to infer 
that bilateral aid is associated with more strings because, since it involves only two parties, a 
consensus on the strings to attach can easily be reached. Conversely, with multilateral aid, 
multiple donors with potentially very conflicting interests are involved. Whereas a recent 
literature survey has established no consistent evidence on the effectiveness of bilateral aid 
vis-à-vis multilateral aid in the development outcomes of recipient countries (Biscaye et al., 
2015), what is granted in our explanation is its consistency with common sense and evidence 
that bilateral aid to former colonies from former colonial powers is strongly tailored in view 
of preserving colonial legacies and strategic interests. Accordingly, the threshold effect 
established in our findings may be due to conflicting strategic interests of multilateral 
donorswhich may indulge them to end-up allocating aid essentially on FDI development 
outcomes. This interpretation is in accordance with Asongu (2014b), “Aid is the outcome of 
bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid 
agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these 
vary over time. For instance, economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare 
improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in French aid. Hence, few would object to the 
inference that our findings may also be explained by a motivation of the French to maintain 
their colonial legacies and influence in Africa” (p. 472).  
In summary, the established foreign aid findings are broadly inconsistent with a recent 
stream of literature on the ‘questionable economics of development assistance’, notably: 
Wamboye et al. (2013), Marglin (2013), Titumir and  Kamal (2013), Ghosh (2013), Krause 
(2013), Banuri (2013),   Monni and Spaventa (2013), Obeng-Odoom (2013), Amin (2013), 
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Quartey and Afful-Mensah (2014) and Asongu (2014b). In essence, the consistent positive 
effect: (i) gives credit to the strand  of literature clarifying the questionable economics of 
development assistance (Asongu, 2014a; Efobi et al., 2014) and (ii)  confirm the established  
rewards of development assistance in economic growth (Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014; 
Kargbo & Sen, 2014), especially when foreign aid is funnelled through educational channels 
(Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Asiedu, 2014). The second point (ii) isvery relevant because, as we 
have highlighted earlier, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) have shown that foreign aid 
positively affects education and lifelong-learning and in a latter study, they have established 
using the same methodology, sample and periodicity that education and lifelong-learning 
mitigate political violence and instability (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), which should be 
positively linked  with terrorists’ activities.  
 A third issue of contention from our findings is that, interactions between terrorism 
and foreign aid dynamics unexpectedly yield negative effects on FDI. This is 
visibleexclusivelyin bottom quantiles of FDI distributions. Notably, this tendency is apparent 
in interactions between: (i) bilateral aid and domestic terrorism in bottom quantiles,  (ii) 
multilateral aid and domestic terrorism in the 0.25
th
 quantile and (iii) multilateral aid and 
transnational terrorism for the bottom quantiles. Moreover, we also notice that on average, the 
threshold value for bilateral aid (5.5) is higher than those for multilateral aid (4.00, 3.13 and 
3.90). This implies, more bilateral aid is needed to change the positive effect of domestic 
terrorism on FDI relative to the amount of multilateral aid needed to reverse the positive gains 
of domestic and transnational terrorisms on FDI.  
 Drawing from the literature, a possible elucidation for the negative interactive 
dynamic could be traceable to the political economy of development assistance because some 
aid categories, allocated for the fight against terrorism, may not be inconsistent with the 
intended purposes, especially as we have established that the underlying impact of terrorism 
on FDI is positive. This may not be understood by foreign policy. It is also important to note 
that foreign aid allocated to boost government revenue in the fight against terrorism may not 
have an incremental effect on overall government income because recent literature has 
established that overly reliance on foreign aid could reduce domestic tax incomes and hence: 
(i) less political accountability and representation  and  (ii) more political instability and 
violence. This narrative is consistent with Eubank (2012) on Somaliland and a broad sample 
of African countries (Asongu, 2015a). Therefore, as a policy implication, it is relevant to have 
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insights into the initial or underlying impact of terrorism on FDI before allocating foreign aid 
to mitigate a ‘potentially negative effect’ which in real terms, may be ‘positive’.   
 Given that we have motivated the choice of the data sample and periodicity with the 
interest of comparing our findings with previous studies which have used the same sample 
and periodicity, we also devote space to discussing how our findings are different from those 
established by Efobi et al. (2015) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014). While the common 
element among these strand of studies is that they have investigated the role of foreign aid in 
mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI, our line of inquiry has steered 
clear of these previous studies by investigating the underlying nexuses throughout the 
conditional distributions of the dependent variable. In this light, our findings have improved 
those of priorexpositions at least in a twofold manner. First, the evidence of a threshold effect 
present in foreign aid (especially multilateral aid) and some of the control variables (trade, 
infrastructure and GDP growth) has enriched the literature significantly. Accordingly, the 
establishment that the benefits of multilateral aid, trade, infrastructural development and GDP 
growth in stimulating FDI consistently improve with increases in initial levels of FDI is 
testament to the motivation for our quantile empirical strategy of considering the entire 
distribution of FDI, contrary to mean values of the dependent variable employed by previous 
studies. Hence, our findings validate the motivation that blanket FDI location policies may not 
be effective unless they are contingent on initial FDI levels and tailored differently across 
high- and low-FDI developing countries. This methodological positioning is being 
increasingly adopted in the determinants of growth (Asongu, 2015b) and FDI in fast-growing 
developing countries (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015).  
 Second, for brevity, purpose of clarity and lack of space, we follow a pedagogical 
comparative line, which requires us to follow a chronological order by first clarifying how 
Efobi et al. (2015) extends Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) so that the contributions of our 
findings discussed so far are apparent and self-evident. The former study has concluded that: 
(i) the negative impact of terrorism on FDI is only apparent in estimations with above-average 
corruption-control levels; (ii) development assistance dampens the negative impact of 
terrorism on FDI exclusively in countries above-average corruption-control levels; (iii)  the 
modifying role of bilateral aid on the effect of transnational terrorisms is consistent with 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), while the stance that only multilateral aid mitigates the adverse 
consequence of FDI is confirmed principally because it curbs the negative effect of 
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transnational terrorism on FDI.  Moreover, the authors also find that the adverse impacts of 
unclear and total terrorism are mitigated by multilateral aid. 
For the sake of remaining succinct and avoiding repetition, our results as discussed 
above differ substantially in terms of: (i) sign of effect of terrorism dynamics; (ii) thresholds 
of significant impact of foreign aid variables and (iii) signs, significance and quantiles of 
marginal effects from the interactive regressions. As a policy implication, applied 
econometrics should not be limited to the mere acceptance or refutation of existing theories, 
extending previous studies with the same sample and periodicity is a useful scientific activity 
that could disclose very relevant policy implications.  
 
4. Conclusion and future research directions 
This study has extended the literature on nexuses among, foreign aid, terrorism and 
FDI by assessing the role of foreign aid on the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI. 
Using an interactive quantile regressions approach, we have steered clear of previous studies 
by investigating the problem statement throughout the conditional distributions for FDI. The 
empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008. 
Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics entail: domestic, 
unclear, transnational and total indicators. The following findings have been established. First, 
while the effects of multilateral aid are consistently significant with positive threshold 
evidence, bilateral aid is only positively significant in the bottom quantiles. Second, with the 
slight exception of transnational terrorism in bilateral aid regressions, the impacts of terrorism 
dynamics are unexpectedly positive, in: (i) bottoms quantiles with domestic terrorism and the 
0.25
th
 quantile with total terrorism, for bilateral aid regressions and (ii) the 0.25
th
 quantile with 
domestic terrorism and bottom quantiles of transnational terrorism, for multilateral aid 
regressions. Third, interactions between terrorism and foreign aid dynamics unexpectedly 
yield a negative effect on FDI, notably in:  (i) bilateral aid and domestic terrorism in bottom 
quantiles, (ii) multilateral aid and domestic terrorism in the 0.25
th
 quantile; (iii) multilateral 
aid and transnational terrorism for the bottom quantiles. Moreover, the modifying threshold 
value of bilateral aid is higher relative to that of multilateral aid. Fourth, there is positive 
threshold evidence from GDP growth, infrastructural development and trade openness on 
FDI.  The positive threshold effects imply, the benefits of corresponding variables in 
stimulating FDI consistently increase with higher initial levels of FDI. Policy implications 
have been discussed.  
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The analysis leaves room for the following future lines of inquiry: (i) investigating by 
what mechanisms terrorism positively affects FDI, (ii) clarifying why development assistance 
and terrorism interact to have a negative impact on FDI, (iii) examining the underlying 
nexuses with a post-2011 terrorism sample (iv) decomposing foreign aid into more 
components and (v) accounting for regional heterogeneity in the examined nexuses.  
 
 
 
References 
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J., (2008), “Terrorism and the world economy”, European 
Economic Review, 52(1), pp.1-27. 
 
Akinwale, A. K., (2010). “Integrating the traditional and the modern conflict management 
strategies in Nigeria”, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
Ibadan, Nigeria. 
 
Akpan,  U. S., Isihak, S. R., & Asongu, S. A., (2014). “Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Fast-Growing Economies: A Study of BRICS and MINT”, African Governance 
and Development Institute Working Paper No. 14/002, Yaoundé.  
 
Amin, S., (2014). “Aid for Development”, Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and 
Practice, 16, pp. 125-137. 
 
Asiedu, E., (2006), “Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural 
Resources, Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Stability”. World 
Economy, 29(1), pp. 63-72. 
 
Asiedu, E. (2014). “Does Foreign Aid in Education Promote Economic Growth? Evidence 
From Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Development, 16(1), pp. 37-59. 
 
Asiedu, E., & Lien, D., (2011), “Democracy, Foreign Direct Investment and Natural 
Resources”, Journal of International Economics, 84, pp. 99-111.  
 
Asiedu, E., & Nandwa, B., (2007), “On the Impact of Foreign Aid in Education on Growth: 
How relevant is heterogeneity of aid flows and heterogeneity of aid recipients?”, Review of 
World Economics, 143(4), pp. 631-649.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013). “Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels 
matter?”, International Journal of Development Issues, 12(1), pp. 36-52.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014a). “A Brief Clarification to the Questionable Economics of Foreign Aid 
for Inclusive Human Development”, African Governance and Development Assistance WP 
28/14, Yaoundé.  
 
22 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “The Questionable Economics of Development Assistance in Africa: 
Hot-Fresh Evidence, 1996-2010”, The Review of Black Political Economy, 41(4), pp.  455-
480.   
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014c). “The impact of health worker migration on development dynamics: 
evidence of wealth effects from Africa”, The European Journal of Health Economics, 15(2), 
pp. 187-201.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015a). “On Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Empirics to 
a Celebrated Literature”, South African Journal of Economics: Forthcoming.  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/saje.12064/abstract 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015b). “Drivers of Growth in Fast Emerging Economies: A Dynamic 
Instrumental Quantile Approach”, African Governance and Development Institute Working 
Paper No. 15/009, Yaoundé.   
 
Asongu, S. A., & Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2013). “The economic consequences of China-Africa 
relations: debunking myths in the debate”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies, 11(4), pp. 261-277. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2015a). “Is Poverty in the African DNA (Gene)?”, 
African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper  No. 15/011, Yaoundé.   
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2015b). “Conditional determinants of FDI in fast 
emerging economies: an instrumental quantile regression approach”, African Governance and 
Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/003, Yaoundé.   
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2016). “Fighting African Conflicts and Crime: Which 
Governance Tools Matter?”, International Journal of Social Economics: Forthcoming.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015a). “Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring”, Revised and Resubmitted: Empirical Economics.   
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015b). “Drivers of FDI in Fast Growing Developing 
Countries: Evidence from Bundling and Unbundling Governance”, African Governance and 
Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/001, Yaoundé.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016a). “The Role of Lifelong Learning in Political 
Stability and Non-violence: Evidence from Africa”, Journal of Economic Studies: 
Forthcoming.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016b). “Foreign aid volatility and lifelong learning: 
demand-side empirics to a textual literature”, International Journal of Social Economics: 
Forthcoming.  
 
Bandyopadhyay, S.,  Sandler, T., &Younas, J., (2014). “Foreign direct investment, aid, and 
terrorism”, Oxford Economic Papers, 66(1), pp. 25-50. 
 
  Bandyopadhyay, S., & Younas, J., (2014), “Terrorism: A Threat to Foreign Direct 
23 
 
  Investment”, Doing Business AbroadPolicy Report 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/re/2014/d/terroris
m.pdf (Accessed: 29/04/2015). 
 
Banuri, T., (2013). “Sustainable Development is the New Economic Paradigm”, 
Development, 56(2), pp. 208-217. 
 
Beets, S. D., (2005). “Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International Corruption.” 
Journal of Business Ethics, 57 (1), pp. 65-81. 
 
Billger, S. M., & Goel, R. K., (2009), “Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling 
corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates”, Journal of Development 
Economics, 90, pp. 299-305. 
 
Biscaye, P., Harris, K. P., Reynolds, T., & Anderson, C. L., (2015). “Relative Effectiveness of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Aid on Development and Social Outcomes”, Evans School of Policy 
Analysis and Research (EPAR) Brief  No. 294, Seattle, Washington.  
 
Black, D., (1990). The elementary  forms of conflict management. New York, Plenum Press. 
 
Boly, A., Coniglio, N., Prota, F.,  & Seric, A., (2015), “Which Domestic Firms Benefit from 
FDI? Evidence from Selected African Countries”,  Development Policy Review; 33(5):  
Forthcoming. 
 
Borg, M. J., (1992). “Conflict management in the modern world-system”. Sociological 
Forum, 7(2), pp. 261-282. 
 
Brambor, T., Clark, W. M., & Golder, M., (2006), “Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses”, Political Analysis, 14 (1), pp. 63-82.  
 
Brockhoff, S., Kieger, T., & Meierrieks, D., (2014). “Great Expectations and Hard Times - 
The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution: doi: 10.1177/0022002713520589.  
 
Caulderwood, K., (2015) “Sub-Saharan Africa Falls Behind In Fight Against Extreme 
Poverty: World Bank Report”, International Business Times (April 14th 2015). 
http://www.ibtimes.com/sub-saharan-africa-falls-behind-fight-against-extreme-poverty-
world-bank-report-1881460  (Accessed: 19/04/2015). 
 
Choi, S-W., (2015). “Economic growth and terrorism: domestic, international, and suicide”, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), pp. 157-181.  
 
Choi, S-W., (2010). “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?”, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution,  54(6), pp. 940-966. 
 
Costa, A., Hermandez, M., & Sebastian-Gallés, N., (2008). “Bilingualism aids conflict 
resolution: Evidence from the ANT task”, Cognition, 106 (1), pp. 59-86. 
 
24 
 
De Grauwe, P., Houssa, R., & Picillo, G., (2012). “African trade dynamics: is China a 
different trading partner? ”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(1), pp. 15-
45. 
 
Efobi, U., Asongu, S., & Beecroft, I., (2015). “Foreign Direct Investment, Aid and Terrorism: 
Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control”, African Governance and Development 
Institute Working Paper No. 15/007, Yaoundé.   
 
Efobi, U., Beecroft, I., & Asongu, S.,  (2014). “Foreign Aid and Corruption: Clarifying 
Murky Empirical Conclusions”, African Governance and Development Institute Working 
Paper No. 14/025, Yaoundé.   
 
Efobi, U., and Nnadi, M., (2015). “How Does Foreign Aid Affect the Relationship between 
IFRS Adoption and Foreign Direct Investment?” African Governance and Development 
Institute Working Paper No. 15/014, Yaoundé.   
 
Eubank, N., (2012), “Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from 
Somaliland”, Journal of Development Studies, 48(4), pp. 465-480. 
 
Feridun, M., & Shahbaz, M.,  (2010). “Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective? 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey”, Defence & Peace Economics, 21(2), pp. 193-205.  
 
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T.,  (2009). “The impact of terrorism and conflicts on growth in 
Asia”, Economics and Politics, 21(3), pp. 359-383.  
 
Gardner, K. L., (2007). “Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way”. Global Governance: A Review 
of Multilateralism and International Organisation, 13(3), pp. 325-345. 
 
Ghosh, J., (2013). “Towards a Policy Framework for Reducing Inequalities”, Development, 
56(2), pp. 218-222. 
 
GTI (2014). “Global Terrorism Index: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of 
Terrorism”, Institute for Economics and Peace, pp. 2-90. 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Repor
t%202014_0.pdf (Accessed: 28/04/2015).  
 
Gyimah-Brempong, K., & Racine, J. S. (2014). “Aid and Economic Growth: A Robust 
Approach”, Journal of African Development, 16(1), pp. 1-35. 
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2002). “Defining the Influence of Education on Social Cohesion”, 
International Journal of Educational Policy, Research and Practice, 3(4), pp. 73-97. 
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2008a). “Education, social cohesion and ideology. In Right to Education: 
Policies and Perspectives,edited by Emin Karip, 89-104. Ankara: Turkish Education 
Association. 
 
Heyneman, S. P., (2008b). “Buying your way into Heaven: The corruption of education 
systems in global perspective.”, Perspectives on Global Issues, 2 (1), pp. 1-8. 
 
25 
 
Hoffman, A. M., Shelton, C., & Cleven, E., (2013). “Press Freedom, Publicity, and the Cross-
National Incidence of Transnational Terrorism”, Political Research Quarterly, 66 (4),  pp. 
896-909.  
 
Humphreys, M., (2005). “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution. Uncovering 
the Mechanisms”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), pp. 508-537. 
 
International Country Risk Guide. (2010) The political risk services group, available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx  (Accessed 10 October 2010). 
 
Johnson A., & Quartey P (2009), “Foreign Aid and Human Development Indicators in sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of Developing Societies, 25(1), pp. 57-83.  
 
Kargbo, P. M., & Sen, K., (2014). “Aid Categories that Foster Pro-Poor Growth: The Case of 
Sierra Leone”, African Development Review, 26(2), pp. 416-429. 
 
Koenker, R., & Hallock, F.K., (2001), “Quantile regression”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, pp.143-156. 
 
Koh, W. T. H., (2007). “Terrorism and its impact on economic growth and technological 
innovation”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74(2), pp. 129-138.  
 
Krause, U., (2013). “Innovation: The new Big Push or the Post-Development alternative?”, 
Development, 56(2), pp. 223-226. 
 
Lee, C., (2015), “Terrorism, Counterterrorism Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment”. Foreign  
Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12087 
 
Le Roux, S., & Kelsey, D., (2015a). “Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and 
Experiments”, Sara le Roux, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Le Roux, S., & Kelsey, D., (2015b). “Strategic Substitutes, Complements and Ambiguity: An 
Experimental Study”, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Marglin, S. A., (2013). “Premises for a New Economy”, Development, 56(2), pp. 149-154. 
 
Meierrieks, D., & Gries, T., (2013). “Causality between terrorism and economic growth”, 
Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), pp. 91-104.  
 
Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., & Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). “A Quality of Growth Index for 
Developing Countries: A Proposal”, IMF Working Paper No. 14/172. 
 
Monni, S., & Spaventa, A., (2013). “Beyond GDP and HDI: Shifting the focus from 
paradigms to politics”, Development, 56(2), pp. 227-231. 
 
Obeng-Odoom, F. (2013). “Africa’s Failed Economic Development Trajectory: A Critique”, 
African Review of Economics and Finance, 4(2), pp. 151-175. 
 
26 
 
Obi, C. I., (2008). “Enter the Dragon? Chinese Oil Companies & Resistance in the Niger 
Delta”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(117), pp. 417-434. 
 
Öcal, N., & Yildirim, J., (2010). “Regional effects of terrorism on economic growth in 
Turkey: A geographically weighted regression approach”, Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 
pp. 477-489.  
 
Okada, K., & Samreth, S.,(2012), “The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile 
regression approach”, Economic Letters, 115(2), pp. 240-243. 
 
Oreopoulos, P., & Salvanes, K. G., (2009). “How Large are Returns to Schooling? Hint: 
Money Isn’t Everything.”, NBER Working Paper No. 15339, Massachusetts.   
 
Quartey P., & Afful-Mensah, G., (2014), Foreign Aid to Africa: Flows, Patterns and Impact, 
in Monga C and Lin J (eds), Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics, Volume 2: Policies 
and Practices, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.  
 
Singh, P., (2001). “Punjab Terrorism: Truth Still Uncovered”, Economic and Political 
 Weekly, 36 (40), pp. 3829-3831. 
 
Singh, P., (2007). “The Political Economy of the Cycles of Violence and Non-violence 
 in the Sikh Struggle for Identity and Political Power: implications for Indian federalism”, 
Third World Quarterly, 28(3), pp. 555-570. 
 
Straus, S., (2012). “Wars do end. Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, African Affairs, 111(443), pp. 179-201.  
 
Thomas, K.W., (1992). Conflict and negotiation processes in organisations. In: Dunnette, 
M.D. and L.M. Hough eds. Handbook of industrial and organisational psychology. Palo Alto, 
CA, Consulting Psychologists Press. pp. 651-717. 
 
Titumir, R. A. M., & Kamal, M. (2013). “Growing Together Sustainably: A zero-poverty post 
2015 development framework”, Development, 56(2), pp. 172-184. 
 
Tull, D. M., (2006). “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479. 
 
Volkema, R. J., & Bergmann, T. J., (1995). “Conflict styles as indicators of behavioural 
patterns in interpersonal conflicts”. The Journal of Social Psychology, 135 (1), pp. 5-15. 
 
Wamboye, E., Adekola, A., & Sergi, B. S. (2013). “Economic Growth and the Role of 
Foreign Aid in Selected African Countries”, Development, 56(2), pp. 155-171. 
 
Word Bank (2015). “World Development Indicators’, World Bank Publications  
http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015  
(Accessed: 25/04/2015).  
 
